What Does Negligence Mean in Defamation Cases by Franklin, Marc A.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 6 | Number 2 Article 1
1-1-1983
What Does Negligence Mean in Defamation Cases
Marc A. Franklin
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marc A. Franklin, What Does Negligence Mean in Defamation Cases, 6 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 259 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol6/iss2/1
What Does "Negligence" Mean in
Defamation Cases?
By MARC A. FRANKLIN*
I
Introduction
When Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,1 was decided ten years
ago, much was said about the impact it would have on several
areas of defamation law.2 It was obvious that the decision was
introducing a variety of new terms and concepts and would al-
ter the way in which actions by private plaintiffs against media
defendants had been litigated-and the way in which the me-
dia would attempt to cope with its strictures. A decade later it
is appropriate to see how courts have met the challenge in one
important area-the administration of the Court's statement
that "so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual."3
The introduction of "fault" analysis in defamation cases, al-
though not unprecedented,4 was bound to create a new range
of uncertainty. The first question involved identifying stan-
dards that would avoid liability without fault. Although the
Court's opinion did not use the word negligence,5 courts
* Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford University. In the early
stages David Hollander, Stanford Law School Class of 1985, and in the later stages Tim
Hale, Class of 1984, provided helpful research assistance. Research for this article was
supported by the Stanford Legal Research Fund, made possible by a bequest from the
Estate of Ira S. Lillick, and by gifts from Roderick E. and Carla A. Hills and other
friends of the Stanford Law School.
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. E.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422 (1975); Ea-
ton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond:
An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under
the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976); Robertson, Defamation and the
First Amendment. In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199 (1976).
3. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 (footnote omitted).
4. Stevens, Negligence in Defamation Before Gertz, 56 JOURNALISM Q. 832 (1980).
5. Four minority opinions did use the term. See 418 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J.,
COMM/ENT L. J.
quickly concluded that this was the minimum that would meet
the Court's requirement.6 No court has sought to impose liabil-
ity in a "Gertz" case on any showing of fault that amounts to
less than traditional negligence. Those that have deviated
from the negligence standard have adopted requirements that
are more onerous than that of negligence.7
But even if the standard is negligence, this does not neces-
sarily mean that the emerging action need resemble in every
way other actions for negligence, such as those involving auto-
mobile accidents. An early debate suggested the range of disa-
greement on this question.
Professor David Anderson' began from the premise that the
New York Times decision9 had addressed the wrong end of the
litigation by making its privilege applicable according to the
subjective state of mind of the defendant. This tended to in-
crease the costs of defending libel actions, even if they were
eventually won by the media defendant. He thought this
weakness of analysis was exacerbated by Gertz, which would
necessarily produce more suits and more trials than had the
Times decision. In the hope of cutting losses, Anderson argued
that the traditional flexibility of ordinary negligence cases
could not be allowed to prevail in libel cases tried under the
Gertz rationale:
[Flew would deny that negligence in the physical torts rep-
resents a very flexible mechanism for obtaining the judgment
of both judge and jury on a specific fact situation. But negli-
gence under Gertz serves an entirely different purpose-the
preservation of a minimum area of "breathing space" for the
press-which it attempts to accomplish by freeing publishers
and broadcasters from liability for innocent misstatements.
Gertz envisions a regime in which publishers who exercise rea-
sonable care need not fear libel judgments, but the hope that
concurring); id. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 376 (White, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38
N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). Even if "negligence" comes to be the
constitutional minimum, the term may have different meanings in constitutional law
and in common law. That is, the Supreme Court may find that the elements of "negli-
gence" are less demanding than those that might be demanded by a state in its defini-
tion of the term. For simplicity, this Article assumes that the word will be given the
same meaning by both state and federal courts.
8. Anderson, supra note 2.
9. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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this will prevent unnecessary self-censorship is illusory. No
one with the slightest appreciation for the myriad uncertain-
ties of common law negligence would rely on the belief that
reasonable care will preclude an adverse verdict. 10
Professor Anderson thus advocated restrictions on the Gertz
version of the negligence action that would protect media de-
fendants from unwarranted liability. These included analogies
to cases where a professional's conduct was judged by existing
tort principles, requiring the professional to "exercise the skill
and knowledge normally exercised by members of his profes-
sion."" Applying this standard to journalists would mean that
the reasonableness of their conduct would be judged according
to existing journalistic standards. Within the medical profes-
sion lines were drawn in terms of the standards of conduct fol-
lowed in the doctor's community or in comparable
communities or by practitioners of the same school. 2 Apply-
ing this standard to journalists would differentiate between
newspapers and magazines, between print media and broad-
cast media, and between those entities that stress vigorous in-
vestigative reporting and those that do not. It was particularly
important to judge defendants "by the standards of publishers
with comparable resources, deadline pressures, space limita-
tions, and technological capabilities. To do otherwise would
create an unwelcome pressure for uniformity."'13 Although
Professor Anderson recognized that geographical differences
would not play nearly as great a role in journalism cases as in
medical cases, "journalistic practices that Keokuk would find
unreasonable might be fully accepted in New York."' 4
Professor Anderson was particularly concerned that courts
not adopt the standard suggested in the Butts and Walker
cases by Justice Harlan: "standards of investigation and re-
porting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."' 5
Professor Anderson doubted that such a single standard in fact
existed in journalism. Even if such a standard did exist, it
would impose a bias in favor of the orthodox media that were
rarely involved in investigative journalism. He was particu-
larly concerned that magazines would suffer because they
10. Anderson, supra note 2, at 460 (footnotes omitted).
11. Id. at 466.
12. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 163 (4th ed. 1971).
13. Anderson, supra note 2, at 467.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 466 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 138 (1967).
No. 2]
COMM/ENT L. J.
spend more of their time than do newspapers, investigating the
underlying aspects of society. 16 His discussion implied recog-
nition that such an approach would require expert witnesses, 7
as is common in other claims of professional negligence. 8
Finally, consistent with his view that the negligence stan-
dard is constitutionally required in journalism cases, Professor
Anderson argued that other procedural protections derived
from the Times case should be applied to Gertz cases as well.
These included the requirement that the requisite fault be
shown with convincing clarity' 9 and that appellate courts
should exercise independent review of the jury's verdict.20 An
ordinary negligence standard would be procedurally inade-
quate because it would give judges little opportunity to review
and reverse inconsistent decisions. A body of conflicting hold-
ings would no doubt develop. The resulting uncertainty sur-
rounding the liability rules would induce risk-averse media to
refuse to publish some material that would cost excessive
amounts of time or money to verify with certainty. These
problems could be minimized by the use of the convincing clar-
ity requirement and the use of rigorous appellate review.
Professor Anderson concluded by noting that Gertz had in-
troduced into defamation, "a field whose own vocabulary is
complicated enough, the vocabulary of negligence law as devel-
oped in the physical torts. Much of that vocabulary is inappro-
priate, confusing, or incomprehensible when applied to
communications torts."2' He feared that this development
might lead courts to lose sight of the constitutional role that
they were required to play in all libel cases, whether under the
Times or the Gertz regimes.22
Even with his proposed protections, Professor Anderson
thought Gertz an unfortunate decision for three reasons: it in-
creased the incentive to self-censor because it increased the
likeliho6d of recovery in cases brought by private individuals;23
it favored journalistic orthodoxy because the conventional
press was more likely to focus its attention on government and
16. Anderson, supra note 2, at 454.
17. Id. at 466-67.
18. P. MuNcH & D. SMALLWOOD, PROFESSIONAL LIABILrry 70 (1976).
19. Anderson, supra note 2, at 467-68.
20. Id. at 467-68.
21. Id. at 480.
22. Id. at 468.
23. Id. at 441-52.
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public figures, leaving coverage of privately exercised power to
magazines and newspapers that emphasize investigative re-
porting;24 and Gertz was unlikely to lend itself to summary
judgments.25
Professor David Robertson responded to his colleague Pro-
fessor Anderson by praising Gertz as a sensible balance of con-
flicting interests.26 Even though he noted that some negligence
concepts had permeated defamation law before Gertz, he rec-
ognized that no solid body of such law existed:
The law must create a largely new sub-species of negligence,
and some observers believe that defamation law requires stan-
dards considerably more specific than are usual in physical tort
cases to avoid needless self-censorship. It is much more likely
that intelligible standards will develop piecemeal on the basis
of post-Gertz decisions focusing closely on the issue of journal-
istic negligence, than that they will spring full-blown from the
minds of judges or commentators.
27
Moreover,
[oince standards of conduct are determined for a variety of
concrete fact situations, the standards for other fact situations
follow naturally in the common law tradition of extension by
analogy. An overall standard begins to emerge, albeit in a
patchwork fashion. So long as the post-Gertz case law, when
taken as a whole, clearly defines an acceptable level of conduct
and sets the burden of ensuring accuracy within reasonable
bounds, any resulting increase in self-censorship should be
small and acceptable.28
Beyond this general discussion, Professor Robertson sug-
gested some specific points that would make the Gertz intro-
duction of negligence less troublesome than Professor
Anderson had feared. He, too, rejected Justice Harlan's stan-
dard of "responsible publishers" as too confining and too ori-
ented toward the establishment media.29  He disagreed,
however, over the role of experts and the use of self-set jour-
nalistic standards. The cases did not present the "technical
complexity involved in malpractice or antitrust suits, and seem
to be within the potential understanding of a jury. "30 Robert-
24. Id. at 453-56.
25. Id. at 456-58.
26. Robertson, supra note 2, at 200-01.
27. Id. at 254-55 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 257.
29. Id. at 257 n.367.
30. Id. at 259.
No. 21
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son foresaw the use of experts "only in exceptional cases.""
Robertson then discussed behavior that he believed should
not be negligence, such as failing to verify a story from a wire
service, unless the facts were so improbable that reliance
would not be reasonable or unless the "facts [were] particu-
larly easy to check because of special circumstances. '32 A pub-
lisher who published a story either after checking the source
and reasonably concluding the source was trustworthy, or after
reasonably checking the accuracy of the story itself, "should be
able to avoid liability for negligence. ' 33 He also suggested that
if the publisher identified the source of a story "so that the
credibility of the newspaper no longer supports the truth of the
statement" and gave the defamed person "equal time" in the
story, the publisher should be able to carry stories that cannot
be verified.34 Finally, Professor Robertson agreed with the im-
portance of "de novo" judicial and appellate review of jury ac-
tion 35 but disagreed that the standard of proof should be "clear
and convincing."36
The debate was carried on with the benefit of very few cases
on the books. Indeed, much of the tenor of the discussion was
concern about how Gertz would operate in fact. It is appropri-
ate to withhold further discussion until after a review of how
the courts have responded to this aspect of Gertz. We will then
return to see whether Professor Anderson's concerns have
been borne out in practice and, if so, whether they are serious
enough to warrant change.
II
The Case Law
Although Gertz permitted the states to adopt any standard
other than strict liability, negligence has been by far the most
popular choice. At least twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia have adopted this standard.37 Federal courts have
31. Id. at 259; cf. Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 656 P.2d 79 (Hawaii 1982).
32. Robertson, supra note 2, at 262.
33. Id. at 263.
34. Id. at 264-65; see also Note, Libel and the Reporting of Rumor, 92 YALE L.J. 85
(1982); Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
35. Robertson, supra note 2, at 249-50.
36. Id. at 248.
37. See the list in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 385-86 n.3 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982), appeal pending. New York may apply negligence in certain types of
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interpreted the law of three additional states as imposing a
negligence standard.3 8 Every court so concluding has had to
decide whether to adopt the professional negligence standard
or the ordinary negligence standard.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts appeared to adopt a pro-
fessional negligence standard for Gertz cases, 9 but few states
have followed suit.' Of these, only the Utah Supreme Court
explained its reasons for preferring the professional negli-
gence standard to the ordinary negligence standard. It as-
serted that an ordinary negligence standard would undercut
the first amendment protections by permitting juries to equate
falsity with negligence.41
A key element in the professional negligence formula is the
choice of the applicable body of customs and practices against
which to judge the defendant. In the medical malpractice field,
as we have seen,42 several rules defining the relevant body
have evolved. The states that have adopted a professional neg-
ligence standard for journalism have not stated which, if any,
related aspects would also be used. Two potential candidates
for adoption are the school rule and the locality rule. The for-
mer provides that the defendant is to be judged only by the
customs followed by members of the school of practice to
which the defendant belongs. In media cases, this rule could
be used to develop separate standards for the various
"schools" of journalism, such as investigative and documen-
tary, or, perhaps, newspaper, magazine, radio and television.
The locality rule is losing strength in medical malpractice
cases.43 Although it may still be unrealistic to blur differences
between small-town practitioners and their metropolitan coun-
terparts, small-town physicians should know which cases can
be handled locally and which should be transferred to skilled
specialists or to hospitals with better facilities. In media cases
there is no discussion of transferring big investigative efforts to
cases. See Gaeta v. New York News, Inc., 95 App. Div. 2d 315, 466 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1983),
rev'd 62 N.Y.2d 340 (1984).
38. Miami Herald, 423 So. 2d at 386 n.3.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1976).
40. The professional negligence standard has been adopted in Gobin v. Globe Pub.
Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla.
1976); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981).
41. Seegmiller, 626 P.2d at 976; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment
g (1976).
42. See P. MUNCH & D. SMALLWOOD, supra note 16, at 70.
43. See, e.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
No. 21
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larger journals. Indeed, some cases explicitly recognize that
limited financial resources of the media defendant should be
taken into account."
Most states have rejected the professional negligence stan-
dard in favor of the ordinary negligence formula.4" Some
courts assert that the professional negligence standard is ap-
propriate for use only in fact situations that are beyond the
comprehension of laymen, and that defamation cases do not fit
this description.46 Others express the fear that permitting the
media to set their own standards would encourage industry-
wide carelessness and result in progressively declining care.47
Trial courts have been given little guidance as to what fac-
tors are relevant to the determination of negligence. The Re-
statement offers one possible list: the trier should consider the
need for prompt publication, the public value of the story, and
the potential damage to the plaintiff's reputation.48 One court
has offered an expanded list:
1) The nature of the information published, the importance of
the matter involved, and specially, if the same is defamatory
per se and the risk of damages can be foreseen.
2) Origin of the information and reliability of its source.
3) Reasonableness in checking the veracity of the informa-
tion considering its cost in terms of money, time, personnel,
urgency of the publication, nature of the news and any other
pertinent element.49
In most cases, only fault, not falsity, was at issue. The de-
cided cases appear to fall into four groups, based on the appar-
ent source of the error involved, though some cases involved
multiple errors. The first group includes those cases in which
the error arose during the gathering of information. The
source of the error is found to be the person or organization
giving the reporter information. The second group includes
cases in which the error is found to have arisen from a re-
44. See, e.g., Greenberg v. CBS, Inc., 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 988 (1979).
45. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); McCall v. Courier-
Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982);
Schrottman v. Barnicle, 386 Mass. 627, 437 N.E.2d 205 (1982); Memphis Publishing Co. v.
Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978).
46. See Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, Inc., 656 P.2d 79, 83 (Hawaii 1982).
47. See, e.g., Troman, 62 Ill. 2d at 198, 340 N.E.2d at 298-99. No court bases its deci-
sion on the fact that journalists are not required to have academic training or on the
fact that they are not licensed.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment h (1976).
49. Torres-Silva v. El Mundo, 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1508, 1511 (1977).
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porter's mistake in recording the information. In the third
group, the error is found to have occurred at the reporting
stage-the reporter either draws inaccurate conclusions or
conveys to readers a different sense than the reporter intended
to convey. The fourth group contains one case in which the
error resulted from a problem in the production process.
The most common type of error was the first, in which the
reporter has been given inaccurate, defamatory information.0
These cases center on whether the defendant's investigation
was reasonable. Most of the discussion has revolved around
the reliability of the original source. The development of clear
rules indicating which sources may be relied upon without fear
of liability would be quite valuable and would support the ac-
ceptability of the ordinary negligence standard. Unfortunately,
the courts have not been consistent in assessing the reliability
of sources, or in the protection they give to media that relied
upon apparently authoritative sources.5" Two cases illustrate
the problem.
In Wilson v. Capital City Press,52 the defendant erroneously
stated that the plaintiff had been among those arrested in a re-
cent drug raid. The paper had obtained the arrest list, which
contained the error, from the public relations director of the
Louisiana State Police. The trial judge, sitting without a jury,
found the paper negligent in not checking further. The appel-
late court vacated the award, holding that the defendant's reli-
ance on that source was not negligent as a matter of law. In
Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.," the plaintiff's pic-
ture had been incorrectly printed along with those of suspects
in a local bank robbery. One defendant contended that the FBI
had provided what it said were photographs of the suspects
and that Mathis's photograph was included. On a motion for
summary judgment, the court stated that reliance on the FBI
would not, as a matter of law, preclude a finding of negli-
50. See, e.g., Thomas H. Maloney & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105,
334 N.E.2d 494, 72 Ohio Op. 2d 313 (1975); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md.
1978); Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Peagler
v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 308, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977); Phillips v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1980).
51. This inconsistency is particularly troublesome for multistate publications,
whose editors and legal staffs cannot be sure whose law will apply under conflicts of
law doctrine.
52. 315 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 1975).
53. 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
No. 2]
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gence.54 Even reliance on two separate sources has not pro-
tected defendants from being found negligent.55
A subset of this group involves cases in which the reporter
does become aware of contradictory information.56 In these sit-
uations, the reporter has been given conflicting versions of the
facts, and knows that at least one version is inaccurate. The
reporter's proper course of action in this situation is not clear.
Gertz implies that a reporter should be permitted to publish a
story where the facts are in dispute, so long as due care with
regard to truth is employed. 57 But does this permit a reporter
to use a balanced report on two sides of a dispute if he cannot
reasonably determine the truth? Professor Robertson sug-
gested that due care in such a case requires only that the re-
porter indicate in the story that the facts are uncertain, and
attribute the conflicting statements to their sources. 58 He rea-
soned that publication in this manner informs the public of the
dispute without vouching for the truth of either side, and that
this represents a satisfactory balance between the interests of
the plaintiff and the public. The controversial doctrine of neu-
tral reportage59 aside, the courts require that once the reporter
has been put on notice that some of his information is incor-
1
54. The Mathis court addressed the issue of reasonable reliance in dictum. It de-
nied the defendant television station's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the FBI was even the source of the
erroneous photograph. If the source issue were favorably resolved, the defendant
could "argue to the jury that the FBI's proven record of reliability in supplying infor-
mation made it entirely reasonable for [defendant] to assume . . . that the FBI had
once again supplied an accurate photograph." Id. at 414. The Wilson court was clearly
more willing to find reasonable reliance, or non-negligence, as a matter of law.
55. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Cholmondelay, 569 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). A sur-
vey of texts on journalistic practice revealed that Woodward and Bernstein's require-
ment of two independent sources in their investigation of Watergate was based on the
anonymity of the sources. Requiring two sources in other situations is "relatively rare
in newswork." G. TUCHMAN, MAKING NEWS 85 (1978). To find negligence for relying on
one source, no matter how reliable, would create liability for the vast majority of re-
porters. To impose liability where two independent sources were relied upon would
push the liability to extreme limits. But see Brosnahan, First Amendment Jury Trials,
LITGATION Summer 1980, at 28 (asserting that reporters who have two sources for the
story are likely to make good witnesses).
56. See, e.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers Inc., 114 Ariz. 308, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977);
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), appeal pending;
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981).
57. See Peaglerv. Phoenix Newspapers, 131 Ariz. 308, 312, 640 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1982).
58. Robertson, supra note 2 at 264.
59. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). Note, A Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation
Should Be Rejected, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (1982).
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rect, his duty is to make a reasonably thorough investigation. °
The second type of error results from a mistake made while
recording the information.6 1 The claim may be that the reporter
was negligent in making the error in the first place by mishear-
ing, misremembering or miswriting his notes. In Schrottman v.
Barnicle,62 for example, the defendant had published an article
on conditions in the plaintiff's section of town. Schrottman,
who was white, was quoted in the article as saying that "life on
Blue Hill Avenue ... is 'o.k. if you're a nigger.' "63 The plaintiff
admitted speaking with the reporter but denied having made
that statement.64 In remanding the case for retrial, the court
suggested that the trier "could consider the testimony concern-
ing Barnicle's note-taking and research methods, as well as the
clarity and reliability of the notes themselves. This evidence
should be viewed in light of circumstances including the rela-
tive risk of harm and the presence or absence of time con-
straints against verification.
6
But there seems to be no need, and no opportunity to recog-
nize the need, to verify a quotation taken directly from a
source if that quotation does not itself implicate others or cre-
ate a contradiction. If it does implicate others or create a con-
tradiction, how does one check such a quotation? Must any
quotation that might prove embarrassing in any situation be
submitted to the source for review and a second thought?
What if the "direct source" takes this second occasion to deny
having made the remark to the reporter?
If the reporter's alleged error occurs in connection with the
source's statement about another person, the claim will be that
the reporter was negligent in failing to seek additional verifica-
tion before publication. The considerations here are similar to
those in the first group of cases. (Indeed, if the credibility con-
flict is resolved for the reporter and against the source, the
case belongs in the first group.)
60. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376; McCall v. Courier-Journal &
Louisville Times, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981); Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, 131 Ariz.
308, 640 P.2d 1110.
61. See, e.g., Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 292 S.E.2d 23 (S.C. 1982); Jenoff v. Hearst
Corp., 453 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1978); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d
78 (D.C. 1980).
62. 386 Mass. 627, 437 N.E.2d 205.
63. Id. at 628, 437 N.E.2d at 207.
64. See infra note 104.
65. Schrottman, 386 Mass. at 641, 437 N.E.2d at 214.
No. 21
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The third group of cases includes those in which the error
occurred when the reporter incorrectly drew a conclusion or
the report was ineptly worded.66 Here, the individual facts are
correct, but incorrect implications are drawn. Whereas the er-
rors in the previously discussed groups result from the inclu-
sion of inaccurate data, the errors in this group usually stem
from the absence of important explanatory information. It can
be extremely difficult to determine when the failure to discover
the problem and add new information (or delete some state-
ments) constitutes negligence. In Benson v. Griffin Television,
Inc .,67 the defendant had broadcast a report incorrectly imply-
ing that police suspected that the plaintiff was involved in a
bank robbery. The reporter had concluded that the plaintiff
was considered a suspect because the police had converged on
a house that might have been the plaintiff's and questioned its
occupant about the plaintiff's whereabouts, and because some
police officials said that the plaintiff had been seen in a car
they thought had been used in the robbery. The plaintiff, in
fact, was never actually considered a suspect. The defendant's
summary judgment was upheld on appeal. The appellate court
observed that "It] he report on the air, although erroneous, rea-
sonably reflects what a reporter could have concluded based
on the undisputed facts. The reporter noted what he observed,
was reasonably faithful to those observations, and displayed
no indifference or negligence regarding their accuracy.""
In Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols,69 the defendant had
published an article stating that the plaintiff (Mrs. Nichols)
had been shot by Mrs. Newton after the latter had appeared at
the Nichols home and found Mr. Newton there with Mrs. Nich-
ols. This story created an erroneous implication of an adulter-
ous relationship between the plaintiff and Mr. Newton. In
reality, not only were Mrs. Nichols and Mr. Newton at the Nich-
ols home, but so were Mr. Nichols and two neighbors, all of
66. See, e.g., Lake Havasu Estates, Inc. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 441 F. Supp. 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593 P.2d 511 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978);
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Seegmiller v. KSL,
Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). Inept wording may be attributable to the editing process
as well as to the reporter's initial choice of words. These cases differ from those in the
first group because in these cases, the reporter has received accurate, if incomplete,
information, whereas in the first group, the information itself, not any resulting conclu-
sions, caused the problem.
67. 593 P.2d 511 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
68. Id. at 514.
69. 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978).
[Vol. 6
No. 21 NEGLIGENCE AND DEFAMATION
whom were sitting in the living room, talking. The story was
apparently based on the arrest record of the shooting incident,
which made no mention of those at the house other than Mrs.
Nichols and the Newtons. The trial court directed a verdict for
the defendant on the ground, among others, that no fault had
been shown. That judgment was reversed on appeal because
the trier of fact could find negligence in the reporter's reliance
on the contemporaneous arrest report rather than investigat-
ing further or waiting for the more complete offense report that
is filed a few days later.
7 0
The fourth category of cases is based on the simplest and
least common type of suit-producing error, a technical produc-
tion mistake. The issue might involve the failure to catch typo-
graphical errors71 or the inclusion of unintended material
2.7
This type of error is the only one that appears not to involve
any real degree of journalistic skill or judgment. It most
closely resembles more common forms of negligence and
might benefit most from the use of outside analogies.
70. For other cases discussing the desirability of reporting stories as quickly as
possible, see Phillips v. Evening Star, 424 A.2d at 83; Liquori v. Republican Co., 8 Mass.
App. Ct. 671, 678 n.7, 396 N.E.2d 726, 730 n.7 (1979); Benson v. Griffin Television, Inc., 593
P.2d at 514.
71. The issue of failing to proofread raises the question of whether the print media
might be held to a standard of perfection in finding typographical errors. Yet, a stan-
dard of negligence does not equate imperfection with fault. Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 27
N.Y.2d 311, 319 265 N.E.2d 762, 767, 317 N.Y.S.2d 347, 353 (1970) (even an expert golfer
may hit a bad shot without necessarily being negligent). The New York court, though
applying a standard more stringent than ordinary negligence, accepted that in the pro-
duction of a newspaper, some typographical errors will result, without exposing the
defendant to liability. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 200,
341 N.E.2d 569, 572, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 65 (1975).
In the first three categories, the author was aware that he was hurting the reputation
of another. It is not clear that a publisher, even if negligent as to a typographical error,
will be liable if the error turns an otherwise innocent story into a defamatory one. In
Gertz, the Court observed that its acceptance of negligence applied only to statements
in which the substance of the statement "makes substantial danger to reputation ap-
parent;" different considerations would apply "if a State purported to condition civil
liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent
editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential." 418 U.S. at 348. Apparently, the
Court was suggesting that a statement published with awareness that it would cause
reputational harm, or which the reasonable editor should have realized had that poten-
tial, would be judged more rigorously than would be errors that surprisingly convert
apparently innocuous statements into defamatory ones.





Several studies of the operation of defamation litigation
show that Gertz defendants do indeed fare poorly in general,
and also when compared with defendants under the New York
Times standard.73 One study showed that plaintiffs won five of
twenty-four Gertz cases compared with five of seventy-five
Times cases.74 A more recent study, looking at the matter in
terms of defendants' success on appeal, found no case "tried to
a negligence standard in which a verdict or judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed based exclusively upon an appellate rul-
ing that the finding of negligence was erroneous. '7 C6mpara-
ble data for Times cases showed that defendants were able to
overturn "actual malice" findings in nine of fourteen cases.
76
Other evidence confirms the difference between the two
standards. During one period, for example, defendants pre-
vailed on fifty-five of sixty-six motions for summary judgment
in Times cases-a success rate of eighty-three percent. During
that same period defendants succeeded in two of six motions
for summary judgments in Gertz cases. 77 The data show not
only a lower grant rate in contested cases but also that far
fewer defendants even seek summary judgment in Gertz
cases.
78
Although defendants fare worse under Gertz than they do
under Times, some data indicate that both groups fare so badly
before juries under both doctrines that sometimes it is hard to
tell the difference. In one study Gertz plaintiffs obtained jury
verdicts in twenty-five of twenty-nine cases, a success rate of
73. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 795, 824-25 (1981). Among publishers, attitudes toward success in litigation
may be determined more by the number of suits filed and the time and expense
needed to resolve them than by the number won. See Franklin, Good Names and Bad
Law: A Critique of Libel and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. REV. 1, 13-23 (1983).
74. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel, supra note 73, at 824-25.
75. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, BULLETIN No. 6, 35, 42 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as LDRC].
76. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel, supra note 73, at 824.
77. LDRC, supra note 75 at 41.
78. Although it is true that the reported cases have yielded about three Times
cases for every Gertz case, this does not begin to explain the disparity between the two
sets of summary judgment motions. See Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A
Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 455, 492 (44 Times
cases to 15 Gertz cases); Franklin, Suing Media for Libel, supra note 73, at 824 (75
Times cases to 24 Gertz cases plus eight cases using a standard higher than Gertz).
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eighty-six percent. Yet this was the same percentage of plain-
tiffs that prevailed before juries under the Times standard-
forty-one of forty-eight.79 This appears to support those who
assert that either juries do not understand the great difference
between proving negligence by a preponderance and proving
actual malice with convincing clarity, or they consciously dis-
regard fault instructions and impose liability because they
have found falsity or because of extraneous biases or sympa-
thies.80 Another explanation may be that so many Times cases
are being weeded out on summary judgment that only the very
strongest are getting to juries.
Even though defendants may prevail on other grounds in
Gertz appeals,8' it apparently has rarely been on the ground
that the jury's finding of negligence was not supported by the
evidence. When this is combined with the limited use by trial
judges of judgment n.o.v.82 and the rare granting of summary
judgments, it is clear that the jury is playing an exceedingly
powerful role in Gertz cases. Whatever constitutional protec-
tion the Supreme Court envisioned judges affording in Gertz
cases, their role is not apparent in practice.83
79. LDRC, supra note 75, at 42.
80. See Brosnahan, supra note 55, at 30 ("[plaintiff cannot over try the falsity is-
sue. Counsel should carefully build a vivid picture of falsity."); Brill, Inside the Jury
Room at The Washington Post Libel Trial, Am. LAw., Nov. 1982, at 93 (reporting jury
confusion about "actual malice"). See also the statement attributed to Jonathan
Lubell, a lawyer who has represented libel plaintiffs, to the effect that the trend of jury
verdicts against the press indicates that "the public believes that the media generally
look at themselves as answerable to nobody, and the public wants the media to be
answerable like any institution." Quoted in advertisement by Mobil Corp., N.Y. Times,
Sept. 15, 1983, at 25.
81. See Franklin, Suing Media for Libel, supra note 73, at 824.
82. Goodale, Survey of Recent Media Verdicts, Their Disposition on Appeal and
Media Defense Costs, 1983 MEDIA INSURANCE: PROTECTING AGAINST HIGH JUDGMENTS,
PUNITrvE DAMAGES, AND DEFENSE COSTS 13, 20-24 (P.L.I.).
83. In addition to examples already noted see Sibley v. Holyoke Transcript Tele-
gram, 391 Mass. 468, 461 N.E.2d 823 (1984). The defendant had published an article
stating that the plaintiffs were being investigated for fraud. The article summarized an
affidavit filed by a police lieutenant that quoted former employees of the plaintiff ac-
cusing him of various crimes. The reporter spoke with the district attorney and the
chief of the police department and attempted to contact the officer who filed the affida-
vit. During the libel trial, two of the former employees reaffirmed their accusations.
The jury nonetheless found for the plaintiff. A motion for judgment n.o.v. on the
ground that there was insufficient evidence to permit a finding of negligence was de-
nied. The judge stated that the jurors
might well have concluded that if the reporter had personally contacted [the
former employees] before writing the article, he would have recognized the
weaknesses of their statements and been more circumspect in his account of
their accusations. They could, I think, find on that evidence that more proba-
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It is hard to tell whether insurance affects this analysis be-
cause so little information is readily available. 4 It seems likely
that at least twenty-five percent of newspapers and broadcast-
ers are uninsured.85 These are generally the smaller and less
affluent ones, though the New York Times is also a member of
the group.8 6 Some insurers base their premiums exclusively on
the size of a newspaper's circulation or a broadcaster's rate
cards after a brief inquiry into the applicant's claims history.
Given comparable claims histories, two publications of equal
size would pay the same rate even if one is an aggressive inves-
tigative publication and the other simply publishes handouts
from public relations sources.87 Although the insured has little
control over the size of the premium, 88 the existence of insur-
ance does not remove editorial timidity for two reasons: the
danger of an adverse claims history for future years and the
universal use of a "deductible" or "retention" approach. This
means that the insured is liable for the first expenses on each
bly than not there was a causal connection between the reporter's failure to
more thoroughly investigate the facts and the publication of the offensive
article.
Id. at 2498.
The judge did grant judgment n.o.v. on the basis of the fair report privilege. See also
Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1974), vacated and remanded, 424
U.S. 448 (1976).
84. Goodale, supra note 82, at 25.
85. This is a very rough estimate. See Anderson and Murdock, Effects of Communi-
cation Law Decisions on Daily Newspaper Editors, 58 JOURNALISM Q. 525 (1981) (re-
porting that of 103 newspaper editors surveyed, 74.8% reported that their papers
carried libel insurance. A further breakdown reveals that 17% did not carry insurance;
six percent were not sure; and two percent did not answer.). See also Kupferberg,
Libel Fever, COLUM. J. Rav., Sept./Oct. 1981, at 36, 39: 'Today, depending on whose
estimate you accept, 40 to 60 percent of all broadcasters and newspapers carry some
libel insurance."
86. Kupferberg, supra note 85, at 39: "'It's considered an aberration,' Times lawyer
Baker says, 'but we don't want people to think they're going to have an easy mark.' For
the same reason, Baker says, the Times has a policy of not settling libel suits for
money (as opposed to a correction)."
87. For example, the application for insurance sold through the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters (NAB) has a question asking for the claims record of the appli-
cant for the preceding five years. The application has no space for a description of the
applicant's programming practices.
88. Although a poor claims record might adversely affect the insured's future pre-
miums, a policy of great conservatism might get the insured a five percent discount for
each consecutive claims-free year (up to a limit of five years) under the NAB policy,
for example. The insured, however, might find any such gain more than offset by its
share of the costs attributable to those in the group whose practices provoked lawsuits,
whether or not justified. The point is that once insurance is acquired, there is a limit to
the control the insured has over the size of the premium.
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claim that is filed against it, ranging in amount from $1,000 for
small newspapers and broadcasters to as much as $500,000 for
larger ones.
For other insurers, content is central to the risk being in-
sured. In one policy, for example, after a coverage amount and
deductible or retention are chosen, various plus and minus fac-
tors are applied to get the precise premium. If the applicant
uses "Call in Hotline, Call for action, etc.," a negative factor of
five to twenty-five percent is invoked; if the station has a delay
system it gets a credit of zero to forty percent; "Unusually Con-
troversial Programs" involve a debit of five to twenty-five per-
cent. Other factors include whether or not a law firm reviews
controversial programming, the role of network programs and
local programming, and the use of news wire services.89 The
wide range in the debits and credits permits room for differ-
ences in each case. In this situation, the applicant immediately
recognizes the direct impact on the premium of the present
and possible future programming. Though the two rating ap-
proaches are unlikely to differ in their effects on day-to-day ed-
itorial decisions, the latter approach seems more likely to
influence fundamental decisions about media style and the use
of investigative reporting.
The size of libel insurance premiums-which depends on
prior claims history, the limits of the coverage, the deductible,
or retention of initial responsibility, and the nature of a variety
of other clauses-ranges upward from as little as $200 per year
for a small broadcaster. 0 Surcharges of twenty-five to fifty per-
cent are likely to apply to media applicants from one or more
states in which the particular insurer has had bad experi-
89. See Broadcasters Broad Form offered by Employers Reinsurance Corp. as filed
with the Nevada Insurance Department in April 1983.
90. A small radio broadcaster (one who charges no more than $20 for its highest
commercial minute) can obtain coverage of up to $1,000,000 per occurrence, with a
$2,000,000 annual aggregate and a deductible of $1,000, for $200 per year. For small tele-
vision stations, the same coverage would cost 90% of their highest hourly program rate
subject to a minimum rate of $350 per year. These policies and rates are available on
standard forms supplied by the NAB. The claim-free discount cannot bring the rate
below the minimum figures. Although a significant number of radio stations can qual-
ify for the minimum rates, the rates for most television stations tend to run in the $600-
700 range.
A daily newspaper with a circulation of 10,000 can get $1,000,000 coverage per occur-
rence and a deductible of $2,500, for $800 per year. For a daily with a circulation of
75,000 to 100,000, coverage of $1,000,000 with a deductible of $10,000 per occurrence costs
roughly $3,000. For a city magazine with a circulation of about 50,000, coverage of
$1,000,000 with a deductible of $7,500 costs roughly $1,250. The newspaper figures are
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ence,9 1 though some smaller insurers do not use such
surcharges because their experience is not large enough to jus-
tify the differentials.
One point to be observed from this brief look at insurance is
that the premium tells only part of the story. The crucial part
appears to be the deductible or retained risk, which must be
expended in every case brought against the insured. In the
case of a city magazine,9 2 for example, the exposure to $7,500 in
costs in every libel claim brought against it, may be more im-
portant than the fact that annual protection costs only $1,250.
Whatever unease is felt by insured publications and broad-
casters must be felt even more strongly by uninsured publish-
ers and broadcasters. Why are so many commercial ventures
still uninsured, even after the recent spate of attention to defa-
mation? Recently, media owners have become painfully aware
of the problem of the Alton Telegraph, a paper with a circula-
tion of 38,000 was held liable at the trial level for $9.2 million.93
The paper, insured for $1 million, could not afford an appeal
bond to keep the plaintiff from trying to collect the judgment
during appeal and sought protection from the bankruptcy
court to stop the collection efforts. It could not pursue its ap-
peal in the state courts, and ultimately settled for $1.4 million.
Although some small media might conclude that no insurance
can help them, it appears that the number of uninsured media
is shrinking. It is not clear, however, how quickly this is hap-
pening or how it is influencing editorial decisions.
IV
Conclusion
An analysis of these cases and the data is revealing. On the
from newspapers that requested anonymity. The city magazine figure is a rough esti-
mate made by an insurer.
In all cases in this note, legal defense costs are included. But surcharges may be
imposed. See infra note 91.
91. The most commonly surcharged states are California and South Carolina.
Some may surcharge in as many as nine states. See Franklin, Winners and Losers and
Why, supra note 78, at 494 (listing other states).
92. See supra note 90.
93. See Curley, How Libel Suit Sapped The Crusading Spirit Of a Small Newspa-
per, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1983 at 1, col. 1. Part of the litigation is discussed in Green v.
Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 107 Ill. App. 3d 755, 438 N.E.2d 203, 63 l. Dec. 465 (1982)
(holding that the bankruptcy filing had deprived the state appellate courts of jurisdic-
tion of the appeal on the merits).
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analytical level, the prediction that an ordinary negligence
standard would produce uncertainty has been realized. Relia-
ble information about the nature of negligence has not
emerged from a decade of litigation. On the contrary, Gertz
cases with similar facts may be resolved in conflicting man-
ners.94 Yet the fact that the ordinary negligence standard has
not produced clear rules does not mean that its use will result
in self-censorship. The argument that self-censorship will re-
sult assumes that there is little financial incentive to publish
stories that might produce litigation. Professor Robertson has
observed that "some economic incentive to publish the stories
must exist or publishers would not print them even under a
knowing or reckless falsity standard."9 5 Moreover, media lead-
ers are reluctant to admit that legal rules might inhibit what
they think are proper practices or coverage.96 On the other
hand, that reality or appearance is rarely found among the less
stable and smaller media which see bankruptcy and great in-
convenience as realistic threats.97
Professor Tribe observed that because of its "heavy depen-
dence on how jurors will react, 'fault' is not a standard which
promises the predictable results or creates the certain expecta-
tions without which journalists and others may too often 'kill'
or emasculate reports they believe to be true because of the
threat of a libel action."98 He concluded that the states should
be required "to develop bodies of law markedly clearer and
94. See supra text accompanying note 52.
95. Robertson, supra note 2, at 260.
96. E.g., Smith, The Rising Tide of Libel Litigation: Implications of the Gertz Negli-
gence Rule, 44 MoNT. L. REV. 71, 87 (1983) ("not many can claim, as does the Washing-
ton Post, that libel litigation has not changed their editorial practices," citing a
conversation with the newspaper's counsel). See also, Friendly, Investigative Journal-
ism Is Changing Some of Its Goals and Softening Tone, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1983 at 8,
col. 1.
97. Curley, supra note 93, reported that after the Alton Telegraph's horrendous
experience, the paper's publisher rejected the opportunity to investigate another epi-
sode of alleged official misdoing, saying, "Let someone else stick their neck out this
time." The same article reports the tribulations of a very small monthly newspaper
(circ. 1,300) that was sued for $20 million by a large milk cooperative. The case was
dismissed after a year. The editor and publisher "lost his girlfriend and months of
work as a result of exhausting legal preparations." Id. at 1, col. 1. The same story is
reported in The Little Guy in the Big Suit, COLuM. J. REV., Jan./Feb. 1983, at 42-43 (re-
citing the burdens of travel, document searches, phone calls, and two occasions on
which the editor had to combine issues to keep his publishing schedule). These situa-
tions are hard to document because, as reported by Friendly, supra note 96, "reporters
or television news directors do not openly discuss the chances they do not take."
98. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 645 (1978).
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more coherent than is customary in the common law of negli-
gence."99 He went even further in addressing the availability
of summary judgment when he warned that it might be neces-
sary "to distill from the decisional law a collection of publish-
ing 'rules of the road' which, if followed, will shield prudent
publishers from defamation actions."'0 0 No markedly clearer
body of law has evolved and no rules of the road have evolved
that offer any serious hope of obtaining summary judgment.
Even though it is difficult to document the predicted self-cen-
sorship,101 there is every reason to expect such reaction in the
face of uncertainty.
In fact, the media face a situation even worse than doctrinal
uncertainty. The actual results are predictable: the substan-
tive protection offered by an ordinary negligence standard is
minimal at every stage up to the appeals. The Restatement's
warning that res ipsa loquitur be used sparingly, if at all, be-
cause it might lead to liability without fault,10 2 has proven to be
meaningless. In every reported case, the plaintiff has made
some effort to show negligence. After all, if the story is false,
some further check would almost certainly have shown this-
and the plaintiff seizes on the most plausible of these unmade
inquiries.
It appears, then, that summary judgments are few and far
between, that juries are willing to impose liability in virtually
all cases of claimed negligence, that trial judges are granting
few judgments n.o.v., and that at least one appeal is required
simply to present the case to an appellate court that is unlikely
to use rigorous review standards. The constitutional protec-
tion actually being afforded media under the Gertz standard
has, at best, been minimal.
As serious as these matters are for all media, they are espe-
cially likely to affect small media adversely. First, there is the
greater likelihood that they are uninsured or perhaps underin-
sured, which should create greater averseness to risk than is
found among large media. Second, to the extent that small me-
99. Id.
100. Id. at 646.
101. This is true for the reasons cited in Friendly, supra note 96. Even if one could
document a decline in investigative reporting, it would be difficult to connect it with
the impact of libel law. See O'Neill, The Ebbing of the 'great investigative wave', ASNE
BULLETIN, Sept. 1983, at 26 (identifying several reasons for the decline in investigative
reporting but not mentioning legal concerns).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1976).
[Vol. 6
NEGLIGENCE AND DEFAMATION
dia and investigative journals do engage in investigative re-
porting, they may find themselves writing about powerful
private people in the community-people who might be called
private under Gertz.10 3 The perverse consequence would be
that the smaller media, who are already less secure financially,
are likely to face greater exposure to liability than the large
media. Third, small media are less likely to face direct compe-
tition for circulation from the same or other media. This may
mean that they have less need to engage in investigative re-
porting or controversy, generally, than might be the case with
the large, urban media. After the demoralizing story of the Al-
ton Telegraph it will be more difficult to persuade small media
owners to run the risk of being sued.
The cases also reveal an important, though narrow, problem
that occurs when the alleged source's testimony conflicts with
that of the reporter. This problem will often arise in cases fall-
ing into the first two groups of cases. Although credibility con-
flicts also occur in non-media negligence cases, they are
particularly acute here because of the incentive for witnesses
to lie, the difficulty of disproving their testimony, and the jury's
general tendency to favor plaintiffs in libel cases.
Sources have an incentive to lie at trial for two reasons.
First, they may wish to disavow statements that were origi-
nally made without anticipating their repercussions.104 Sec-
ond, witnesses may lie to avoid being named as defendants in a
libel suit. This problem arises whenever a source has, for
whatever reason, given inaccurate information that may sub-
ject him to liability. Given the propensity of jurors to favor
plaintiffs, 10 5 the fault requirement may offer the media little
protection in these cases. 0 6 Although the "actual malice" as-
103. But see Note, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages in Libel Actions, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1382, 1424 (1977) (suggesting that persons who achieve prominence in
small communities are likely to be called public figures. The author seeks to protect
small media in such cases by barring public figures from recovering punitive
damages.).
104. Schrottman v. Barnicle may be an example of this. It is notable that in addi-
tion to suing for libel, Schrottman also sued the reporter for invasion of privacy, argu-
ing that Barnicle never identified himself as a reporter. It is not implausible to think
that Schrottman did make the quoted statement but did not expect it to be printed in
the local paper. Cf. LaRue, Living with Gertz: A Practical Look at Constitutional Libel
Standards, 67 VA. L. REV. 287, 293 (1981).
105. See supra text accompanying note 78. In addition, several of the cases dis-
cussed in the text reveal jury verdicts that can be explained only in terms of the jury's
resolving the credibility conflict against the reporter.
106. LDRC, supra note 75.
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pect of the Times standard may offer little additional protec-
tion in pure credibility disputes, 1 7 the requirement of clear
and convincing proof may induce courts to grant summary
judgments or judgments n.o.v. in such cases. °8 The nature of
source-reporter conflicts helps to explain why reporters would
like to engage in secret tape recording to create and preserve a
credible record. 10 9
The overall picture justifies the great concern that many
have expressed over the operation of the Gertz approach dur-
ing the past decade. 110 Most of the criticism has been directed
at the public-private distinction. Some critics have objected
that the Court has adopted the wrong approach by relying on
the nature of the plaintiff rather than on the subject matter of
the communication' or on a combination of the two criteria.
112
Others have objected that even assuming the correctness of
the public-private distinction, the Court has provided little gui-
dance in helping lawyers or media predict with any accuracy
which regime will be held applicable in a specific case. 1 3 Be-
yond these problems, the limitation of actual injury damages
107. Since the issue is credibility, a jury determination that the reporter is the one
to be disbelieved can be reached on the basis that the reporter's memory has failed
him or that he is lying on the witness stand. The varying levels of fault in Gertz and
Times may not be effective to protect media in such a situation. See LaRue, supra note
104.
108. See Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1972) (Bell, J., specially
concurring) (arguing that the clear and convincing proof standard be applied to prov-
ing the article false), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972).
109. Consider, e.g., the use of a recorder in E.W. Scripps Co. v. Cholmondelay, 569
S.W.2d 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), wherein two sources contradicted at trial information
they had allegedly given a newspaper reporter who was attempting to verify his story.
See also, Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977) (statutory
prohibition of taping of conversations without all parties' consent held constitutional),
appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 920 (1978) (Brennan, White and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting)
(no substantial federal question). See also Cunningham, Ombudsmen, Council ponder
phone taping, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 27, 1983, at 38 (discussion of secret taping).
110. E.g., Christie, Underlying Contradictions in the Supreme Court's Classification
of Defamation, 1981 DUKE L.J. 811; McCarthy, How State Courts Have Responded to
Gertz in Setting Standards of Fault, 56 JOURNALISM Q. 531 (1979); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITTrrmONAL LAw 631-51 (1978).
111. E.g., Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking the Bastion of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 25 ST. Louns U.L.J. 501, 502 (1981).
112. E.g., A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 19 (1981).
113. E.g., Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1224
(1976) ("Neither the values that are protected by free speech nor those protected by
the recognition of a tort action to protect reputation can be safeguarded and promoted




has not offered much protection.1 1 4
This article has addressed a still different aspect of Gertz:
the operation of the negligence principle it established. The
results suggest that here too, the Gertz approach has failed.
This failure is so clear and so serious that it alone should jus-
tify renewing the search for acceptable standards in libel
cases. The fact that other aspects of the case are also unsatis-
factory should only hasten that day.
114. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court adopted an expansive
view of the phrase "actual injury damages." The result was that in a study of three and
one-half years of reported litigation, only one court "found the showing inadequate."
Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why, supra note 78, at 493 n.83. See TRIBE, supra
note 98, at 648 ("The point is not that intangible injuries such as humiliation and
anguish are insignificant or not deserving of compensation, but rather that the rule
requiring proof of damages this broadly defined does not succeed in its aim of limiting
jury discretion.").
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